ORIGINAL

11/2

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RANDY YORDY,

Plaintiff

No. 1:01-CV-0206

v. :

(Judge Kane)

SCOTT BROWN, PAUL EVANKO, :


BERON F. STEAGER, AND BARRY L. : BRINSER, et al., :

Defendants :

FILED HARRISHURG, P

NOV 2 7 2002

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT EVANKO'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT



D. MICHAEL FISHER Attorney General

GREGORY R. NEUHAUSER Senior Deputy Attorney General

SUSAN J. FORNEY Chief Deputy Attorney General Chief, Litigation Section

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 717-787-8106

Date: November 27, 2002

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COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS

OF

DAUPHIN COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA

VS. : Agg. Asslt; DUI; Recklessly

Endangering; Resisting

Arrest

RANDY ADAM YORDY : NO. 685 C.D. 1999

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

GUILTY PLEA

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE JOSEPH H. KLEINFELTER, P.J.

DATE: TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2000

2:11 0'CLOCK P.M.

PLACE: COURTROOM NO. 1

DAUPHIN COUNTY COURTHOUSE HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL L. ROZMAN, ESQUIRE Chief Deputy District Attorney For - Commonwealth

JOSHUA D. LOCK, ESQUIRE For - Defendant





<u>TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 15, 2000</u>

2

1

(The following proceedings occur at 2:11 p.m.:)

4

5

3

MR. ROZMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

6

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

7

MR. ROZMAN: Commonwealth calls the case docketed to

8

685 C.D. 1999, the Commonwealth v. Randy Adam Yordy.

9

The Defendant is present in the courtroom, along

10

with his counsel. Mr. Lock.

11

Defendant is presently charged with criminal attempt

12

homicide, aggravated assault, driving under the influence,

13

recklessly endangering another person, and two counts of

14

resisting arrest.

15

There is a proposed plea agreement in this case.

Commonwealth would ask the Court to dismiss the criminal

16

Your Honor. The plea agreement is as follows:

17 18

attempt homicide. The aggravated assault which is presently

19

graded as a Felony II and is at Section 2702(a)(2) will be

20

amended to a Felony II aggravated assault, 2702(a)(3).

21

will plead guilty to the 2702(a)(3) aggravated assault and the

22

rest of the charges, the driving under the influence,

23

recklessly endangering and resisting arrest.

24

The record should reflect that the trooper that was involved in this is present in the courtroom, Trooper Scott

25

```
Brown, and I would ask Trooper Brown to rise.
 1
 2
              Trooper, you heard me outline the plea agreement to
 3
    the Judge.
 4
              Do you agree with the plea agreement?
 5
              TROOPER BROWN: Yes. sir.
 6
              MR. ROZMAN: Does the Court have any questions of
 7
   the trooper?
 8
              THE COURT:
                          No.
 9
             MR. ROZMAN: Again, Mr. Yordy, I am going to go
    through some of your rights with you.
10
11
             You must answer my questions loudly enough so that
12
   the court reporter can hear you and record your answers.
13
             How old are you?
             THE DEFENDANT: I'm 42.
14
             MR. ROZMAN: How far did you go in school?
15
             THE DEFENDANT: I'm a graduate.
16
             MR. ROZMAN: So you read, write, and understand the
17
   English language?
18
19
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do.
             MR. ROZMAN: Are you presently under the influence
20
21
   of any alcohol or drugs or anything that would prevent you
   from understanding what's going on here today?
22
23
             THE DEFENDANT:
                             No.
             MR. ROZMAN: If at any point you don't understand
24
   something I say, please stop me, and I will try and explain it
25 l
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1
    and maybe Mr. Lock will also try and explain it.
  2
              Okay?
  3
 4
              (The Defendant nods head up and down.)
 5
 6
              MR. ROZMAN: I want you to understand that any time
 7
    you're charged with a crime in Pennsylvania, you have a right
    to a trial by jury.
 8
 9
              In a trial by jury, 12 people from Dauphin County
   sit and listen to all the evidence in the case. They would
10
   decide the case based on that evidence.
11
                                             Their verdict would
   have to be unanimous. All 12 of them would have to say that
12
13
   you're guilty for you to be found guilty, or all 12 of them
   have to say you're not guilty for you have to be found not
14
15
   guilty.
16
              You, along with your attorney and the
17
   district attorney assigned to the case, would pick these 12
   people.
18
19
             Do you understand your right to a trial by jury?
20
             THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes.
21
             MR. ROZMAN: Do you understand that once you plead
22
   guilty, you give up your right to a trial by jury?
23
             THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
             MR. ROZMAN: You also have a right to a nonjury or
24
   bench trial. A bench trial is the same as a trial by jury
25
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except a judge would take the place of a jury and listen to all the evidence and decide whether you are guilty or not guilty based on that.

Do you understand your right to have a nonjury or bench trial?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I do.

MR. ROZMAN: Do you understand, again, that you are giving up your right to a nonjury or bench trial?

> THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. ROZMAN: In either a jury or nonjury trial, you have certain rights.

First of all, you are presumed innocent. Commonwealth must prove you guilty of each charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

You have a right to cross-examine all the Commonwealth witnesses through your attorney. You have the right to present your own witnesses. You have the right to take the stand and testify in your own behalf, but if you choose to not take the stand, you cannot be forced to take the stand and testify and that cannot be held against you.

Do you understand all those things?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand, yes.

MR. ROZMAN: You understand when you plead guilty, you limit your appeal rights to specific areas. First, the voluntariness of your plea; whether you're doing this of your 1 own free will.

2

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Second is the jurisdiction of this Court in accepting the plea, and so long as the crime occurred in Dauphin County, this Court has jurisdiction.

And the third would be the legality of the sentence that the Judge would impose. If he were to give you an illegal sentence, you could challenge that. If the sentence he gave you was legal, you couldn't challenge that.

Do you understand all those things?

THE DEFENDANT: I understand.

MR. ROZMAN: Now, sir, you understand that aggravated assault, 2702(a)(3), which is what you're pleading guilty to is a felony of the second degree?

14

15

(The Defendant nods head up and down.)

16

17

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. ROZMAN: The maximum you could receive -- I'm not saying this is what you're going to get -- but the maximum you could receive is up to 20 years in prison.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

MR. ROZMAN: Driving under the influence is a misdemeanor of the second degree as is recklessly endangering another person as is resisting arrest.

The maximum you could receive for each one of those

influence.

24

25

charges is up to 2 years in prison. 2 Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: 3 Yes. 4 MR. ROZMAN: Now, sir, the first count is the 5 attempted homicide, and we're asking that the Court dismiss 6 that. 7 The second count is aggravated assault. And the 8 aggravated assault, it's charged that on or about February 4. 9 1999, that you did cause or attempt to cause bodily injury to 10 a police officer, which is Trooper Scott Brown of the 11 Pennsylvania State Police, and what you did is you got into a 12 fight with Trooper Brown about the time of the arrest. And at 13 some point right before the two of you parted company, he was 14 dragged by you in your car for some number of feet. 15 Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: 16 Yes. 17 MR. ROZMAN: How do you plead? Guilty or not guilty? 18 19 THE DEFENDANT: You're asking me for attempted 20 homicide? 21 MR. ROZMAN: No, aggravated assault. THE DEFENDANT: Aggravated assault, guilty. 22 MR. ROZMAN: The third count is driving under the 23

It's charged that you did drive, operate, or were in

```
actual physical control of the movement of a motor vehicle
 1 |
 2
   while you were under the influence of alcohol to such a degree
    that you were rendered incapable of safe driving.
 3
              Do you understand that charge, sir?
 4
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
 5
              MR. ROZMAN: How do you plead? Guilty or not
 6
 7
   guilty?
              THE DEFENDANT:
                              Guilty.
 8
              MR. ROZMAN: The fourth count is recklessly
 9
   endangering another person.
10
              You are charged with recklessly engaging in conduct
11
   which placed or may have placed another person in danger of
12
   death or serious bodily injury.
13
             Again, that's Trooper Brown, and it all has to do
14
   with the fight and dragging him with the pickup truck.
15
             Do you understand that charge, sir?
16
             THE DEFENDANT:
                             Yes.
17
             MR. ROZMAN: How do you plead? Guilty or not
18
19
   guilty?
             THE DEFENDANT:
                              Guilty.
20
             MR. ROZMAN: The fifth count is resisting arrest.
21
             It's charged that you were being arrested for
22
   driving under the influence and you ended up fighting with
23
   Trooper Brown.
24
             Do you understand that charge?
25
```

	,		
1	A Yes.		
2	Q How do you plead? Guilty or not guilty?		
3	THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.		
4	MR. ROZMAN: The sixth count is resisting arrest.		
5	At the time Troopers Barry Brinser and Beron Steager of the		
6	Pennsylvania State Police were arresting you for the incident		
7	involving Trooper Brown, and you had a fight with them too.		
8	Do you understand that?		
9	THE DEFENDANT: Yes.		
10	MR. ROZMAN: How do you plead? Guilty or not		
11	guilty?		
12	THE DEFENDANT: Guilty.		
13	MR. ROZMAN; Will the Court accept the plea?		
14	THE COURT: Yes.		
15	Mr. Lock, I understand from our prior conversation		
16	6 that you wish a pre-sentence investigation in this case?		
17	MR. LOCK: Yes, sir.		
18	THE COURT: All right.		
19	Well, we will accept the plea agreement and we		
20	accept the guilty plea .		
21	I guess I should ask you, Mr. Lock, are you		
22	satisfied that your client is entering a voluntary,		
23	intelligent, and knowing plea of guilty?		
4	MR. LOCK: Yes, he is.		
5	It's reluctant, but it's both knowing, voluntary,		

and intelligent. It is all of those things, yes. 2 THE COURT: And, Mr. Yordy, are you satisfied with 3 the representation you've received from Mr. Lock? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, very much so. 4 5 THE COURT: Do you have any questions at all about 6 what you're doing here today and the consequences that may 7 flow from your pleas of guilty? 8 THE DEFENDANT: No. My attorney was good. 9 advised me. 10 THE COURT: Well, then we will defer sentencing 11 pending the receipt of a county pre-sentence investigation to 12 Thursday, March 23, 2000, at 11:30 in the morning. 13 Now, sir, do you have a driver's license right now? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I do. I don't have it with me. 14 15 Actually, I left my wallet in the car. 16 THE COURT: I see. Well, I was going to direct that 17 as a condition of continuing bail that you not drive since, as you know, your license will be suspended. 18 19 MR. LOCK: If Your Honor wishes, I can make arrangements to have that surrendered to the Clerk perhaps 20 21 tomorrow -- not perhaps. 22 If it is acceptable to the Court, tomorrow. THE COURT: We'll ask you to do that, please, and is 23

25 MR. ROZMAN: Nothing on behalf of the Commonwealth,

there anything further we have to do today then?

24

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1
    Your Honor.
  2
              MR. LOCK:
                          No. Thank you, very much.
  3
              THE COURT: All right.
  4
              Mr. Yordy, where do you live?
  5
              THE DEFENDANT: In Grantville.
  6
              THE COURT: Do you own a home there?
 7
              THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. We own a whole apartment
 8
   building, yeah.
 9
              THE COURT: Should you move between today and
10
    March 23rd for any reason, you'd be obligated to notify both
    the District Attorney and the Clerk of Courts of any change of
11
12
    address.
13
              All right?
              THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
14
15
              MR. LOCK: Thank you, Your Honor.
16
              THE COURT: See you back here on the 23rd.
17
18
              (The proceedings are concluded at 2:31 p.m.)
19
                              --000--
20
21
22
23
24
```

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the proceedings and evidence are contained fully and accurately in the notes taken by me on the guilty plea of the above cause, and that this is a correct transcript of the same.

COPY

Official Court Reporter

The foregoing record of the proceedings upon the guilty plea of the above cause is hereby approved and directed to be filed.

Joseph H. Kleinfelter, P.J.

Date

The Law Offices of SPERO T. LAPPAS 205 State Street Post Office Box 808 Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17108-0808 (717) 238-4286

By: SPERO T. LAPPAS, Esquire
Pa. Supreme Court identification no. 25745

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RANDY YORDY,
PLAINTIFF

SCOTT BROWN,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

PAUL EVANKO,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

BERON F. STEAGER, individually and in his official capacity as an employee and agent of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE Defendant

BARRY L. BRINSER,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

JOHN DOE 1,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

JOHN DOE 2, individually and in his official capacity as an employee and agent of CVIDACTION 1 - () 2 ()

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

JUDGE

FILED HARRISBURG

FEB 1 2001

MARY E. D'ANDREA, CLERK

DEPUTY CLERK

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT
B

the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE Defendant

JOHN DOE 3,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

JOHN DOE 4,
individually
and in his official capacity
as an employee and agent of
the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
Defendant

COMPLAINT

AND NOW comes the PLAINTIFF by and through The Law Offices of SPERO T. LAPPAS, and makes this COMPLAINT against the above named Defendants.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

The Law Offices of SPERO T. LAPPAS

 $By: \$

SPERO T. LAPPAS, Esquire ATTORNEYS FOR THE PLAINTIFF

COMPLAINT

AND NOW comes the PLAINTIFF by and through The Law Offices of SPERO T. LAPPAS, and makes this AMENDED COMPLAINT against the above named Defendants, respectfully representing as follows:

PRELIMINARY AVERMENTS

- PLAINTIFF RANDY YORDY is an adult individual residing within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
- 2. DEFENDANT SCOTT BROWN is an adult individual who was at all times material to this cause of action an employee. agent, servant and officer of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE.
- 3. DEFENDANT BERON STEAGER is an adult individual who was at all times material to this cause of action an employee. agent, servant and officer of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE.
- 4. DEFENDANT BARRY BRINSER is an adult individual who was at all times material to this cause of action an employee. agent, servant and officer of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE.
- 5. DEFENDANT PAUL EVANKO is an adult individual who was at all times material to this cause of action an employee, agent, servant and officer of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE. At such relevant times, he was the commissioner of the pennsylvania state police. In that office he had authority and control of all facets of the operation of the PSP including personnel and disciplinary matters.

- 6. All actions described in this Complaint as being taken by the individual defendants were taken in the course and scope of their employment as members of the PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE.
- 7. All of the Defendant's actions described within this Complaint either <u>infra</u> or <u>supra</u>, were intentional, malicious and taken in bad faith; in the alternative, those actions were reckless; in the alternative, those actions were negligent. None of those actions were privileged, or in the alternative, any privilege which would have otherwise attached was lost through abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.
- 8. All of the Defendant's actions described within this Complaint either <u>infra</u> or <u>supra</u>, were taken under color of state law.
- 9. All harms, damages, and injuries suffered by the PLAINTIFF were the direct, legal and proximate results of the wrongful acts of the DEFENDANTS as described in this Complaint.
- 10. The causes of action brought in this Complaint are brought pursuant to inter alia Title 42, United States Code, sections 1983, 1985 and 1988, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and the Civil Rights laws of the United States.
- 11. Jurisdiction is founded upon 28 USC § 1331 and 1341 and the aforementioned statutory and constitutional provisions.
- 12. Plaintiff further invokes the pendent jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide claims arising under State Law.

13. This court has jurisdiction over this case.

FACTS

- 14. On February 4, 1999 the Plaintiff was driving his motor vehicle in the County of Dauphin, Middle District of Pennsylvania.
- 15. At that date, time, and place, DEFENDANT BROWN, who was then and there employed as a police officer with the PSP, stopped the vehicle for the purported reason of investigating a possible driving under the influence offense.
- 16. During the course of that stop, DEFENDANT BROWN became violent, and assaulted the PLAINTIFF.
- 17. DEFENDANT BROWN's assault upon the PLAINTIFF caused the PLAINTIFF to suffer the following injuries, and losses, inter alia:
 - a. he suffered the loss of income;
 - b. He was deprived of his liberty;
 - c. He suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, mortification, and distress;
 - d. He was subjected to unlawful, illegal and unreasonable and unconstitutional use of force;
 - e. He was subjected to unlawful, illegal and unreasonable and unconstitutional arrest, detention, confinement, and inconvenience;
 - f. He was deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitutions of the United States of Pennsylvania and further in violation of state and federal law;
 - g. He was put in fear of his well-being;

- h. He suffered the loss of valuable federally protected rights.
- i. The Plaintiff sustained physical injuries, damages, and losses, including physical and mental pain and suffering;
- j. The Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and other expenses related to the incident;
- k. The Plaintiff has lost earnings and/or earning capacity;
- 1. The Plaintiff was required to undergo medical care;
- m. The Plaintiff was required to incur costs and/or to expend money on medical care, health care, and incidental expenses;
- n. The Plaintiff was for a time partially disabled;
- The Plaintiff has suffered grave and severe physical injuries;
- p. The Plaintiff has suffered great and severe physical and emotional pain, suffering and upset;
- q. The Plaintiff has been prevented from taking part in and performing the activities of employment, home life, personal life and social and recreational activities;
- r. The Plaintiff has been forced to undergo great and substantial inconvenience, aggravation, and loss of life's pleasures.
- 18. The PLAINTIFF narrowly escaped the aforementioned assault with his life, and in fact, DEFENDANT BROWN unlawfully and

unconstitutionally discharged his firearm at the PLAINTIFF and PLAINTIFF'S vehicle as the PLAINTIFF was fleeing.

- 19. PLAINTIFF then returned to his home whereupon several other PSP officers, some of whom are know to PLAINTIFF as DEFENDANTS STEAGER and BRINSER, and others of whom are unknown and are denominated JOHN DOE defendants in this action pending their identification through discovery and investigations, came to PLAINTIFF's home and assaulted him viciously, perhaps in unlawful retaliation for PLAINTIFF's supposed prior confrontation with DEFENDANT BROWN.
- 20. This assault upon PLAINTIFF at PLAINTIFF'S home aggravated the PLAINTIFF'S previous injuries and furthermore caused the following injuries, and losses, <u>inter alia</u>:
 - a. he suffered the loss of income;
 - b. He was deprived of his liberty;
 - c. He suffered great humiliation, embarrassment, mortification, and distress;
 - d. He was subjected to unlawful, illegal and unreasonable and unconstitutional use of force;
 - e. He was subjected to unlawful, illegal and unreasonable and unconstitutional arrest, detention, confinement, and inconvenience;
 - f. He was deprived of his liberty in violation of the Constitutions of the United States of Pennsylvania and further in violation of state and federal law;

- g. He was put in fear of his well-being;
- h. He suffered the loss of valuable federally protected rights.
- i. The Plaintiff sustained physical injuries, damages, and losses, including physical and mental pain and suffering;
- j. The Plaintiff incurred medical expenses and other expenses related to the incident;
- k. The Plaintiff has lost earnings and/or earning capacity;
- 1. The Plaintiff was required to undergo medical care;
- m. The Plaintiff was required to incur costs and/or to expend money on medical care, health care, and incidental expenses;
- n. The Plaintiff was for a time partially disabled;
- The Plaintiff has suffered grave and severe physical injuries;
- p. The Plaintiff has suffered great and severe physical and emotional pain, suffering and upset;
- q. The Plaintiff has been prevented from taking part in and performing the activities of employment, home life, personal life and social and recreational activities;
- r. The Plaintiff has been forced to undergo great and substantial inconvenience, aggravation, and loss of life's pleasures.
- 21. At all relevant times, DEFENDANT BROWN's personality,

character, proclivities and record with the PSP was such as to disqualify him from continued employment as a police officer. His personality, character, proclivities and record, and/or his record of prior citizen assaults, disciplinary charges, and official misconducts identified him as one who was illusted to continued employment, and revealed him as a hazard to the citizens of this Commonwealth.

- 22. DEFENDANT BROWN's record would have revealed that disciplinary action, removal from duty, or reassignment was appropriate and that he should not be allowed to continue in police employment, or at least that he not be allowed to interact with members of the public in such a fashion as to allow his dangerous proclivities to present a menace to the public.
 - 23. In spite of these facts, DEFENDANT EVANKO:
 - a. failed and refused to exercise proper disciplinary control and supervision over DEFENDANT BROWN;
 - b. failed to remove DEFENDANT BROWN from patrol duties;
 - c. failed to take adequate and sufficient steps to protect the public in general and this PLAINTIFF in particular from DEFENDANT BROWN's dangerous proclivities.
 - d. failed to institute such procedures within PSP practices as would lead to BROWN's removal, reassignment, effective discipline or dismissal.

24. DEFENDANT EVANKO'S failures and actions as described in this complaint are the proximate cause, or one proximate cause, of the PLAINTIFF'S injuries, losses and harms.

COUNT 1 PLAINTIFF V. BROWN VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 25. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 26. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 2 PLAINTIFF V. EVANKO VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 27. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 28. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 3 PLAINTIFF V. BERON F. STEAGER VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 29. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 30. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 4 PLAINTIFF V. BARRY L. BRINSER VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 31. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 32. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 5 PLAINTIFF V. JOHN DOE 1 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 33. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 34. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 6 PLAINTIFF V. JOHN DOE 2 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 35. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 36. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 7 PLAINTIFF V. JOHN DOE 3 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

37. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.

38. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 8 PLAINTIFF V. JOHN DOE 4 VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 39. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 40. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against this Defendant for compensatory and punitive damages plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

COUNT 9 PLAINTIFF V. ALL DEFENDANTS VIOLATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

- 41. All other paragraphs of this Complaint are incorporated into this count by reference thereto.
- 42. WHEREFORE, the PLAINTIFF demands judgment against these Defendants jointly and severally for monetary damages, plus costs of litigation and attorneys' fees.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

The Law Offiges of SPERO T. LAPPAS

By:

SPERO T. VLAPPAS, Esquire

Pa. Supreme Ct. ID no. 25745

205 State Street

P.O. Box 808

Harrisburg, PA 17108-0808

(717) 238-4286

ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RANDY YORDY, :

Plaintiff

No. 1:01-CV-0206

v. :

(Judge Kane)

SCOTT BROWN, PAUL EVANKO,

BERON F. STEAGER, AND BARRY L. :

BRINSER, <u>et</u> <u>al.</u>,

Defendants

<u>ANSWER</u>

Defendants, Scott Brown, Paul Evanko, Beron Steager and Barry Brinser, by their counsel, hereby submit this answer to the complaint.

FIRST DEFENSE

The numbered allegations are answered as follows:

- 1. ADMITTED.
- 2. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that, at all material times, Scott Brown was an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police.

 The remainder of this numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 3. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that, at all material times, Beron Steager was an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police.

The remainder of this numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.

- 4. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that, at all material times, Barry Brinser was an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police. The remainder of this numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 5. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that, at all material times, Paul Evanko was an employee of the Pennsylvania State Police and held the position of Commissioner. The remainder of this numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 6. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are ADMITTED.
- 7. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.

- 8. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are ADMITTED.
- 9. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 10. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 11. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 12. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 13. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
 - 14. ADMITTED.
- 15. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. DENIED that the reason for the traffic stop was "purported." The remainder of this numbered paragraph is ADMITTED.
 - 16. DENIED.
 - 17. DENIED.

- DENIED. a.
- DENIED. b.
- DENIED. c.
- ď. DENIED.
- DENIED. e.
- DENIED. f.
- DENIED. g.
- DENIED. h.
- DENIED. i.
- DENIED. j.
- DENIED. k.
- DENIED. 1.
- DENIED. m.
- DENIED. n.
- DENIED. ο.
- DENIED. p.
- DENIED. q.
- DENIED. r.

- 18. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that Brown discharged his firearm. The remainder of this numbered paragraph is DENIED.
- 19. ADMITTED in part; DENIED in part. ADMITTED that Steager and Brinser came to plaintiff's home. The remainder of this numbered paragraph is DENIED.

20. DENIED.

- a. DENIED.
- b. DENIED.
- c. DENIED.
- d. DENIED.
- e. DENIED.
- f. DENIED.
- g. DENIED.
- h. DENIED.
- i. DENIED.
- j. DENIED.
- k. DENIED.
- l. DENIED.
- m. DENIED.

- n. DENIED.
- o. DENIED.
- p. DENIED.
- q. DENIED.
- r. DENIED.
- 21. DENIED.
- 22. DENIED.
- 23. DENIED.
 - a. DENIED.
 - b. DENIED.
 - c. DENIED.
 - d. DENIED.
- 24. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 25. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 26. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.

27. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.

- 28. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
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- 37. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 38. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 39. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 40. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 41. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.
- 42. This numbered paragraph contains conclusions of law to which NO RESPONSE is required; to the extent they are deemed factual, they are DENIED.

SECOND DEFENSE

The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

THIRD DEFENSE

At no time did defendant, either individually or in concert with others, deprive or seek to deprive plaintiff of any rights, privileges or immunities secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

FOURTH DEFENSE

At all material times, defendant acted with a reasonable good faith belief in the lawfulness of his actions and is entitled to immunity therefor.

FIFTH DEFENSE

Any harm occurring to plaintiff, which harm is specifically denied, was the proximate result of actions or inactions of persons other than answering defendant.

SIXTH DEFENSE

Any harm occurring to plaintiff, which harm is specifically denied, was the proximate result of actions or inactions of plaintiff himself.

SEVENTH DEFENSE

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.

EIGHTH DEFENSE

Plaintiff is estopped to litigate his claims against defendant.

NINTH DEFENSE

Defendant is immune from suit.

TENTH DEFENSE

The complaint is meritless, frivolous or vexatious warranting an award of attorney's fees against plaintiff.

Wherefore, judgment should be entered in favor of defendants, together with costs and attorney's fees.

Respectfully submitted,

D. MICHAEL FISHER Attorney General

By:

GREGORY R. NEUHAUSER
Senior Deputy Attorney General

SUSAN J. FORNEY
Chief Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Litigation Section

OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 15th Floor, Strawberry Square Harrisburg, PA 17120 717-787-8106

DATE: October 5, 2001

YORDY VS BROWN, ET AL

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1	וו אור מד	NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
		DDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
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	RANDY YORDY,	:
4	PLAINTIF	·F :
		:
5	vs.	: NO. 1:01-CV-0206
		:
6	SCOTT BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY A	ND IN :
	HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN	: JUDGE KANE
7	EMPLOYEE AND AGENT OF THE	:
	PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,	:
8	DEFENDAN	T :
		:
9	PAUL EVANKO, INDIVIDUALLY A	ND IN :
	HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS AN	:
10	EMPLOYEE AND AGENT OF THE	:
	PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE,	
11	DEFENDANT, ET	ALII :
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	DEPOSITION OF:	PAUL J. EVANKO
17	7 .2	
1.0	TAKEN BY:	PLAINTIFF
18	DEFORE	TICA A HANGBYY BERGER
1.0	BEFORE:	LISA A. HANSELL, REPORTER
19	DAME -	NOVEMBER 1 3002 10.00 2 M
20 21	DATE: PLACE:	NOVEMBER 1, 2002, 10:00 A.M. PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE
4	FUACE:	1800 ELMERTON AVENUE
22		HARRISBURG, PENNSYLVANIA
23		WWW.19DOKG! FEMMSINAMIA
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YORDY VS BROWN, ET AL

1 APPEARANCES: 2 SERRATELLI, SCHIFFMAN, BROWN & CALHOON, PABY: SPERO T. LAPPAS, ESQUIRE 3 FOR - PLAINTIFF 4 OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: GREGORY NEUHAUSER, ESQUIRE 5 FOR - DEFENDANTS 6 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL 7 BY: THOMAS F. JAKUBIAK, ESQUIRE FOR - DEFENDANTS 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	PAUL J. EVANKO, cailed as a witness, being sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LAPPAS: Q Commissioner Evanko, as you know, my name is Spero Lappas, and I've asked you to be here today to give a deposition in a case that was filed by my client, Randy Yordy, against you, Scott Brown and certain other people in connection with an incident that took place involving Scott Brown and some of the other troopers of the Pennsylvania State Police on February 4, 1999. Obviously, I know that you've taken depositions before, but just let me remind you not to begin answering a question until I've completed it and to confirm for you that if at any time during the course of the deposition you want to consult with either of the attorneys who are present here on your behalf you certainly may do so simply by asking. Now, for the purposes of this record, would you tell us, please, how long you've been the Commissioner of the Pennsylvania State Police? A Since February of 1995. And what are your duties as Commissioner of
1 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 WITNESS 3 FOR PLAINTIFF DIRECT CROSS 4 Paul J. Evanko 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25	the Pennsylvania State Police? A I'm responsible for the overall administration and command of the Department and the budget. Q What responsibilities do you have with respect to discipline of members of the Pennsylvania State Police? A I designate those duties to be done by the Deputy Commissioner of Operations through the Department Bisciplinary Officer. Q Do you have any supervisory authority over disciplinary matters? A In so much as I can dismiss troopers and impose significant discipline based upon the recommendation of the disciplinary officer. Q Is there one member that's designated disciplinary officer? A There is a disciplinary officer and an assistant disciplinary officer. Q Who is the disciplinary officer today, for example? A Captain Barry Titler, and the assistant is Lieutenant Carl Harrison. Q Do you know offland how long Captain Titler has been the disciplinary officer? A A couple of years, but I don't know the specific time.

YORDY VS BROWN, ET AL

8 6 Q Do you know who was the disciplinary officer I see. Turn, please, then to the next page, which begins Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 relates -- I'm sure your 2 before he was? counsel would confirm this - to a disciplinary - a 3 Α I believe it was Captain Dave Points. Q grievance filed by Scott Brown with respect to the 4 Now, as you probably know, one of the issues 5 allegation that he had engaged in an unwelcome and involved in this case is the disciplinary record of a Trooper Scott Brown. I'm going to be showing you certain unnecessary touching of a civilian officer, who is 6 exhibits during the course of the deposition, but in general identified here as Christine Kosh. Were you ever made aware 7 8 terms do you know anything about Trooper Brown's of the fact that Trooper Brown had been found to have 9 engaged in the unwelcome and unnecessary touching of disciplinary record? 10 10 Christine Kosh? No, I don't. 1.1 Q Do you know what his current status is with Not that I recall, no. 11 A 12 12 the Pennsylvania State Police? 0 And according to this opinion of the 13 No. I don't. 13 arbitrator, Mr. Brown was given a one-day suspension. I 14 As I was being escorted into the conference 14 believe the actual infraction was conduct unbecoming but -15 room here, I noticed there was a posting out in the lobby of yes, conduct unbecoming and performance of duty. I take it 16 16 this office that indicated he was currently on suspension you were not ever made aware of this particular infraction? 17 17 without pay. Do you know anything about that? MR. NEUHAUSER: I'm going to object, Counsel. 18 18 No, I don't. I don't think the decision was a one-day suspension. The 19 MR. LAPPAS: Off the record. 19 last page says a written reprimand. So to the extent that (Discussion held off the record.) 20 20 21 MR. LAPPAS: Okay. Well, evidently --21 BY MR. LAPPAS: 22 Now, Commissioner Evanko, the packet of MR. NEUHAUSER: I object to the form. 22 23 23 materials that I've just handed you consists of a number of MR. LAPPAS: You're correct, the original 24 discipline imposed was a one-day suspension, and then by 24 exhibits, and although we're not going to discuss all of them, we are going to discuss some of them, but there are virtue of this order it was reduced to a one-day reprimand. 7 9

eleven of them in total. The first document is marked as Exhibit 1, and it is a memorandum dated June 25, 1997. It's 2 3 a one-page memorandum that deals with Trooper Scott Brown. 4 Have you ever seen this document before? 5 A 6 Q Would you take a moment and read it, please? 7 A 8 Okay. Now, Paragraph 2 -- and, just for the 9 record, this is a memorandum from Captain Larry Williams, 10 who identifies himself as the disciplinary officer as of June 25, 1997. 11 Paragraph 2 reads that "A review of Trooper 12 Scott A. Brown's personnel record reveals repeated 13 violations of Department rules and regulations. These 14 recurrent infractions raise serious questions as to Trooper 15 Brown's willingness to conform to acceptable standards of 16 behavior as established by the Department." Were you ever 17 made aware of this opinion or this conclusion of Captain 18 19 Williams? 20 A Not that I recall. 21 Q Is this the sort of matter -- this sort of 22 opinion expressed by a disciplinary officer, would this 23 normally reach your attention? It would depend what the discipline was 24

imposed for whatever the infraction was here.

2 Q Would I be correct in stating that you were 3 not made aware of this particular infraction? 4 That is correct. I don't recall knowing about 5 that. 6 Q Now, the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 3, 7 deals with a disciplinary action report indicating that on 8 August 2, 1997 Trooper Brown used foul language, yelled, ġ threatened and lost composure while interacting with the 10 family of a Brian Plasterer, and this is signed by Captain 11 Marcantino. Were you ever made aware of this particular 12 infraction? 13 A No, sir, not that I recall. 14 As a result of the information reported in 15 Exhibit 3, Trooper Brown apparently was cited for violations 16 of the requirement to have courtesy and also cited for 17 committing unbecoming conduct. Exhibit 3 has three pages to 18 it, and then it's followed by a memorandum from Trooper 19 Brown, which is marked as Exhibit 4. Would you look at that 20 memorandum, please? Take a moment. It's relatively short, 21 a page and a half. Take a moment, please, to review it. 22 A I've read it. Let me read Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. 23 24 Q Certainly. 25 I've read it.

BY MR. LAPPAS:

3 (Pages 6 to 9)

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In Exhibit 4, Trooper Brown presents evidence A 2 Q which he asks to be considered in mitigation of his penalty, 2 3 and he indicates, for example, at Paragraph 5 that at the time of this threatening and abusive conduct -- I'm sorry --

4 5 foul language, yelling, threatening, and loss of composure 6 he was being treated for strep throat by a licensed

7 physician. Would you, as the Commissioner of the State 8 Police, believe that a strep throat would be a factor to

9 mitigate the use of foul language, threatening, and yelling

10 at civilians?

11

19

A No, sir.

12 The next paragraph indicates - again in

mitigation of the penalty or in explanation of his behavior, 13

I'm not sure which one - that Trooper Brown indicates that 14

15 on the day that he engaged in this yelling, threatening, and

16 loss of composure it was humid and it was -- the temperature

was 85 degrees. Would you feel that was evidence in 17

18 mitigation of this kind of behavior?

> A No. sir.

20 Now, I don't believe it's in these particular

21 documents, but the specific language that Trooper Brown used

22 is cited elsewhere in the record as being, I believe, that

23 he referred to these people as assholes. Trooper Brown

indicates in Paragraph 7 that he did so in order to, to use

his language, provide a positive influence on the juvenile.

No. sir.

Well, then please take a moment and read

Exhibit 5 as to the typewritten pages.

A I've read it.

5 Now that you've read it, would it continue to

be your testimony that you're not familiar with this 6

7 incident until just today?

> A The only thing I'm familiar with is - if this

9 is the one where there was a window rolled up on his arm and

10 he was drug, if that's the same incident, I was aware that

11 there was a trooper involved in something like this, but I

12 don't know if this is the same -

It doesn't sound like the same incident to 0

14 me.

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A Then my answer is no, I don't recall ever

16 seeing this.

17 Assuming that the facts of the underlying

18 incident are consistent with the facts as reported in this

memo by Lieutenant Grolemund, would you agree that Trooper

20 Brown committed a number of infractions of your misconduct

21 regulations?

22 Yes, I would.

Now, the next exhibit, Exhibit 6, deals with

24 the investigation of the Lemoyne Borough incident, the

investigation of the incident described in Exhibit 5, and

11

Would you agree that that's a good way to provide a positive

2 influence on a juvenile?

MR. NEUHAUSER: I'm going to object in the 3 4 sense that the question has assumptions in it that this

5 witness may not be prepared to accept.

6 BY MR. LAPPAS:

For the purposes of my question, assume that

8 during the course of the behavior that's relevant to

Exhibits 3 and 4 Trooper Brown used the word asshole. Would

10 you think that was an appropriate way to provide a positive

11 influence?

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MR. NEUHAUSER: With those assumptions, you 12

13 can answer.

14 With the assumptions that he has done so with 15 a juvenile involved in what was it, the theft of a bicycle?

BY MR. LAPPAS: 16

> 0 Right.

A My answer would be no.

19 Now, the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 5,

deals with an incident that's alleged to have taken place on 20

21 April 10, 1996 in the Borough of Lemoyne in Cumberland

County. This, again, involves Trooper Brown, and the 22

23 memorandum is prepared by Lieutenant Grolemund. I hope I'm

24 pronouncing his name correctly. Are you aware of this

incident, Commissioner Evanko?

I'm going to ask you to take a moment to read Exhibit 6. It

consists only of this one page. 2

A I've read it.

Now, the second to the last paragraph in 4

Exhibit 6 -- I'm sorry. The second full paragraph in the

section called details indicates towards the end of that

paragraph that during a disciplinary meeting - actually, I

think it's described as a pre-disciplinary conference --

between Trooper Brown and Lieutenant Grolemund Trooper Brown

10 made statements to Lieutenant Grolemund which he

11 acknowledged to be, in the Lieutenant's words, untruthful

12 and a lie, and then the lieutenant summarizes this by saying

13 Brown stated he lied to avoid getting into trouble. Would

it be considered in your understanding a disciplinary

15 infraction for a trooper to lie to a matter - lie to a

superior officer concerning a matter under investigation? 16 17

Yes, sir.

Q 18 The second to the last paragraph of this

19 exhibit states that - and I'm not reading it in full, but

it states that Trooper Brown's admission of a deliberate and

21 intentional lie to the investigating officer casts doubt on

22 Brown's credibility on all relevant parts of this

23 investigation in which he is contradicted by evidence or

other testimony. Would you agree that that is an 24

appropriate conclusion for Trooper Grolemund to have reached

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4 (Pages 10 to 13)

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YORDY VS **BROWN, ET AL**

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under these circumstances? I think it is.

MR. NEUHAUSER: Again, with the continuing objection that the question has assumptions and all the Commissioner's been aware of is what you presented to him.

MR. LAPPAS: Right. That assumes, of course, that the facts concerning this pre-disciplinary conference are consistent with the way they were reported by Lieutenant Grolemund in Exhibit 6.

Now, the next exhibit, which is Exhibit 7, consists of a cover page and then two typewritten pages, and I'm going to ask that you review this exhibit, please. Take as much time as you want.

14 While you're doing that, let me just state for 15 the record that the exhibits that I'm discussing with the 16 witness are identical to the exhibits that were attached to 17 the plaintiff's brief in opposition to the defendant's 18 motion in limine which was filed with the court on October 19 24th of 2002, and because of that I don't propose to attach 20 them to the transcript.

21 MR. NEUHAUSER: Okay. Let's note for the 22 record that the witness has left the room in order to answer 23 a telephone call.

24 (Recess.)

I've read it.

1 psychological staff or any treatment or doesn't it matter to 2 you?

MR. LAPPAS: Let's ask the question with respect to any kind of psychological or mental health

BY MR. LAPPAS:

If a trooper had indicated to the Pennsylvania State Police that he was receiving mental health treatment for an acknowledged psychological or mental health problem, would the Department have the authority to request that those treatment records be opened and be delivered to departmental personnel for review?

I'd have to check with the Deputy of A Administration to see if we have authority to do that,

15 And would your answers be the same that you 16 don't have any specific recollection of having done that 17 either personally or through your subordinates on any other 18 occasions?

A That is correct.

19 20 The next document, which is marked as 21 Exhibit 8, is an opinion and award of an arbitrator, who's 22 identified as Lynne M. Mountz. I'm not going to ask you to 23 read this entire document, although if you'd like to you 24 certainly may.

I will summarize it by telling you that this

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BY MR. LAPPAS:

Now, towards the end of this exhibit, the bottom of the second page of the exhibit, Trooper Brown indicates that he has taken proactive steps to correct his shortcomings. He states that he's currently receiving prescribed medication for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and he is seeing Department Psychologist Larry Walker. He has come to terms with his family situation.

If a trooper under your command is receiving psychological treatment, do you have the right to request that his treatment records be opened to his superior officers in the Pennsylvania State Police?

I'd have to -A

14 Do you understand the question? Q

15 I understand, and I'd have to ask the Deputy 16 of Administration because I'm not sure.

17 Okay. Do you remember any situation in which 18 you have asked for treatment records for a trooper who 19 acknowledged that he was having psychological problems?

20 I can't remember that I have asked that, no. Α

21 Are you aware of any cases where other State 22 Police officials have asked for that information?

23 I'm not personally aware of that, no. 24 MR. NEUHAUSER: Counsel, just for

25 clarification, was the question limited to department deals with a grievance which Trooper Brown filed after

2 receiving a discipline concerning the Garcia matter, which

3 is the incident that was described in exhibits -- I guess

4 they were 6 and 7 -- 5, 6 and 7. Again, I will tell you,

5 and ask you to assume -- and your counsel can correct me if

6 I'm wrong -- that the Department imposed a discipline on 7 Trooper Brown. He grieved it alleging, among other things,

that the discipline had not been filed in a timely fashion

9

and that he asked that it be rescinded based upon what is 10 described here as a violation of the Statute of Limitations.

Now, I take it you're familiar with the fact that the Collective Bargaining Agreement and perhaps other regulations of the State Police require that disciplinary charges be filed within a certain period of time; is that accurate?

A Yes, sir.

And it's my understanding from reading this 18 document -- and tell me if this is consistent with your 19 understanding -- that if the charges are not filed within 20 the appropriate time the member who is affected by those

charges can ask that they be dismissed or rescinded?

22 A He can propose that argument to the 23 arbitrator.

24 Right. He has a right to file a grievance, 0 25 and then it goes to arbitration, and he can seek dismissal

5 (Pages 14 to 17)

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YORDY VS **BROWN, ET AL**

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I think that is correct, yes, sir.

And then it's up to the arbitrator to make the

of the charges on the basis that they were too late?

final decision under those circumstances?

Yes, it is. A

Now, is reassignment from one job duty within 6 Q the Department to another job duty a disciplinary matter 7 8 that a trooper can grieve?

A I don't think that's grievable.

10 0 So, hypothetically, when Trooper Brown was

11 found to have violated departmental regulations in

12 connection with the Garcia matter and his disciplinary

suspension was rescinded by Arbitrator Mountz, could he have 13 14 been reassigned from patrol duty, for example, to desk duty?

MR. NEUHAUSER: For any reason or based on the arbitration decision?

MR. LAPPAS: For any reason.

18 MR. NEUHAUSER: Whether it's related to the

19 arbitration or not?

MR. LAPPAS: Right. 20

21 BY MR. LAPPAS:

22 My question is basically this: does the

23 Commissioner or anyone acting subordinate to the

24 Commissioner have the authority to reassign a trooper from

one job duty to another without that transfer or

deliberate lie on a matter during an investigation, and now we have the Garcia incident which involves drawing a gun and engaging in other kinds of conduct which led to a ten-day suspension. That ten-day suspension was then rescinded on a technicality of the Statute of Limitations violation.

Now, I know this is a long question, and those are the introductory remarks. Once this happens and the discipline is rescinded, was there any reason that you're aware of that Trooper Brown couldn't have been moved from patrol duties, where he would come into day-to-day contact with the general public, to say desk duty or something that would be slightly less, to use my term, dangerous?

MR. NEUHAUSER: For the record, I'm going to object on the foundation. I'm not going to instruct him not to answer, but, just for the record, assuming that all the facts, the chronology and everything that you just said in your prefatory statement is correct, I'll allow him to answer, but we're not conceding that that is accurate.

18 19 MR. LAPPAS: I acknowledge that.

20 MR. NEUHAUSER: Do you understand?

And the question is could be have --

22 BY MR. LAPPAS:

> In light of all the things we've discussed, could he have been reassigned from patrol duty to something

that wouldn't put him in such close contact with the public,

19

reassignment being a disciplinary, grievable matter?

Consistent with any provisions that might be contrary to the Collective Bargaining Agreement, I think the troop commander does have that authority.

Okay. Do you know what kind of provisions 5 6 would make such a reassignment contrary to the Collective 7 Bargaining Agreement?

R I think there's some provisions in there that 9 have to do with seniority in positions and the need to take 10 the less senior person in some circumstances if you're going 11 to change duty positions. I'd have to sit down with the 12 Deputy of Administration and get that clarified.

I understand. Well, let's use the Trooper Brown situation as the focus of our discussion. As of April of 1998 when Arbitrator Mountz rescinded his discipline, he had been involved in the matter with a juvenile, a bicycle theft case in which he was disciplined for being threatening and abusive, using foul language, etcetera. He had received a previous discipline for unwanted and unwelcome, I think is the term, inappropriate touching of Ms. Kosh.

Captain Williams had filed a memorandum indicating that Trooper Brown's recurrent infractions raised serious questions as to his willingness to conform to acceptable standards of behavior. He had been found by I

25 think it was Lieutenant Grolemund to have engaged in a desk duty or dispatch or - I don't know what else is available or what would have been available. Could he have been transferred to something else?

MR, NEUHAUSER: Assuming no other violations of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, which he's already testified to, and - with all those assumptions, could he be transferred?

MR. LAPPAS: Correct.

I'd have to really confer with the Deputy of Administration to make sure of my answer. BY MR. LAPPAS:

Q Who would that be that you would confer with?

13 Lieutenant Colonel Hawthorne Conley. A

14 I understand that you need to consult with

15 Lieutenant Colonel Conley, but as a general proposition would it be true that troopers are assigned at the 16

17 discretion of the administration and can be reassigned to 18 positions where their particular qualifications best suit

19 20 Consistent, again, with the articles of the A 21 contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

22 Okay. Now, the next document in this packet 23 is Exhibit 9. Now, Exhibit 9 is the deposition of Trooper

24 Brown in this particular case, and I'm confident that you 25

have not - I do not expect that you would have seen this

21

6 (Pages 18 to 21)

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22 24 1 before today. Is it accurate that you've not seen it before 1 Cadieux, and it's addressed to Michael S. Marrone, M.D., today? 2 2 State Police Medical Officer at this address, 1800 Elmerton 3 Α That is accurate. Avenue, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. And, for the record, this 3 4 Q Now, I've told you that the arbitrator's 4 is Exhibit 10, and the date of this exhibit is November 17, 5 decision concerning the suspension that is dealt with in 5 2000 6 Exhibit 8, Arbitrator Mountz's decision in April of 1998, 6 MR. NEUHAUSER: Just for the record, we'll 7 reversed or rescinded Trooper Brown's ten-day suspension 7 note that this was after the incident about which plaintiff 8 because of a Statute of Limitations problem. 8 complains in this case. 9 Now, in Trooper Brown's deposition, 9 MR. LAPPAS: Right. The date of this document 10 specifically at Pages 18 and 19, I discussed with him the 10 is some year and a few months after the February '99 11 reasons for Arbitrator Mountz's decision, and at Page 18, 11 incident which is in the bottom left-hand corner of that sheet, 12 BY MR. LAPPAS: 12 starting at Line 16, he indicates that that suspension was 13 13 0 First of all, do you know anything about the 14 completely revoked, taken out of my file, and dismissed. 1 14 circumstances by which Trooper Brown was asked to be asked him on what grounds, and he states that the grounds 15 evaluated by Dr. Cadieux? 15 16 were that it wasn't justified. Then we continued to discuss 16 Α No, sir. 17 this onto Page 19, and he states beginning at Line 1 he, 17 Q Do you know Michael S. Marrone, M.D.? 18 referring to the arbitrator, felt that I -- in his 18 A Yes, I do. 19 statements, his findings, he found that I not only complied 19 0 And he's identified here as State Police 20 with Pennsylvania State Police regulations, I also complied 20 Medical Officer. Is that, in fact, his position? 21 with the current law in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 21 A Yes, sir. 22 was justified in doing what I did. 22 Is he a full-time employee of the Pennsylvania 23 Now, let's assume for the purposes of this 23 State Police, or is he a consultant? What exactly is his 24 question that the documents that you have in front of you 24 affiliation with the Department? I think he works part time for the Department. are accurate and that the arbitrator based her decision on a 25

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Statute of Limitations timeliness problem and that she never 2 at all found that Trooper Brown had complied with State 3 Police regulations, that he had complied with the current 4 law of the Commonwealth, and further she never found that he 5 was justified in doing what he did. Let's further assume 6 for the purpose of my question that Trooper Brown had been made aware of the reasons for the arbitrator's decision. 7 Would it be considered a violation of State 8 9 Police policy for him to have given - not policy, but the regulations which govern the conduct of troopers -- for him 10 to have given false testimony while under oath at his 11 12 deposition? I guess it depends what his understanding of 13 A the arbitrator's decision was based on. 14 15 Right. Okay. I understand that. If it could be determined that he understood that the decision was a 16 Statute of Limitations decision, that she had specifically 17 refused to deal with the merits of the case, and then he had 18 19 testified that she found that everything was fine and he was cleared, would that kind of false testimony be a violation 20 21 of State Police regulations? If that's what was his understanding, yes, 22 A 23 slr. Okay. Now, the next document, which is 24 Exhibit 10, is a multiple page memorandum from a Dr. Roger 25

Now, I understand that you've testified that 1 2 you're not familiar with the circumstances by which Corporal 3 Brown was asked to see Dr. Cadieux, but are you familiar 4 with whether or not the State Police can require members to 5 submit to psychiatric evaluations? 6 I know that we have the authority to order an 7 independent psychiatric evaluation. 8 And has that authority been in place as long 9 as you've been the Commissioner? I believe that it has been, yes, sir. 10 A 0 Generally, who within the Department has that 11 12 authority to require an independent psychiatric evaluation? 13 I believe the Deputy Commissioner of 14 Administration has that authority. 15 And could you also order it by your own 16 authority? 17 A I could, if it got to my level. 18 And does the Department have the authority to 19 either suspend or reassign or otherwise take a member out of 20 service based upon evidence that is revealed during the 21 independent psychiatric examination? 22 I would think that we would. A 23 Q Okay. Now, from your own experience as -- and 24 I don't mean as the Commissioner - an officer of the Pennsylvania State Police -- and I understand you've held a

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Why is that?

Because if the individual chooses a

court-martial, I'm not supposed to have background

information that might prejudice my decision in a

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26 28 great many positions within the Department -- what would be court-martial proceeding. the criteria that you feel would be important in deciding 2 Q You have ultimate court-martial authority? 3 whether to order an independent psychiatric examination of a 3 A Yes, I do. 4 trooper? 4 Q If I remember anything about the court-martial 5 A There are provisions in the policy that spell procedure, there's a panel of officers that conducts the 6 out what they are, and without looking at them I'm going to 6 court-martial hearing; is that correct? 7 be speculating. 7 I've never had to do one, but my understanding 8 Are you telling me that there are certain 8 is that there's a panel of officers that I preside over. regulations that provide for the criteria for having that 9 You, yourself, preside over the actual 10 sort of evaluation done? 10 hearing? 11 I think they are either in policy or practice. 11 A I think that's the case, but I've never had to Are they written down somewhere? 12 Q 12 do one. 13 I think they are. 13 I see. The court-martial regulations, I MR. LAPPAS: Can we ask to have a copy of 14 14 guess, are spelled out somewhere in a regulatory handbook or 15 those regulations or whatever the proper terminology would 15 someplace? be provided to us? 16 16 A They're spelled out somewhere. 12 MR. NEUHAUSER: Sure. We'll look for it. 17 Q Okay. Just to summarize, we've discussed a 18 MR. LAPPAS: All right. 18 number of disciplinary problems that Trooper Brown had BY MR. LAPPAS: 19 19 experienced from I think the first date we talked about was 20 Now, Commissioner Evanko, when we began the sometime in 1996 up throughout the course of the next few 20 21 deposition, you indicated that, if I understood you 21 years. If I understand your testimony correctly, none of 22 correctly, you have ultimate disciplinary authority within 22 these matters had ever been brought to your attention before 23 the Department, but you have designated that authority to 23 today. Am I correct in that? some of your subordinate officers. Would that be accurate? 24 24 Did we discuss the one where he had a window 25 A That is accurate. 25 rolled up on his arm and was drug? 27 29 And as you have made this designation, have 1 I do not believe that is one of the ones that 2 you imposed any requirements on the subordinate officers 2 we've talked about today. 3 that certain kinds of cases be brought to your attention? 3 That's the only case that I would have been 4 There are provisions, and, again, I would have 4 aware of. I don't recall any of these other ones. 5 to sit down with the Deputy of Administration to specify 5 The one that you remember, having the window 6 exactly which of those come to me for final penalty and 6 rolled up, was he disciplined in any fashion on that 7 disposition. For example, dismissals would come to me. 7 occasion? 8 Instead of concentrating on the ultimate 8 I don't know. 9 disposition of a case, my question was I guess directed more 9 0 I know that you have a large department, but 10 towards the kind of misconduct that might or might not be 10 had you ever been made aware of Trooper Brown for any reason 11 committed by a member. Are there certain kinds of 11 whatsoever? Not that I recall, no. 12 misconduct cases that you require that you be made aware 12 13 of? If a trooper shoots somebody are you supposed to be 13 0 Now, during the course of the deposition 14 made aware of that, or commits a felony? 14 today, we've referenced the fact that there are regulations 15 Yes. I'm to be made aware of significant 15 in place that govern the operation of the State Police, and 16 violations of Department regulations, but I don't -- in 16 I think we discussed disciplinary type regulations. 17 those cases where I am made aware of those, I get a synopsis 17 regulations that deal with other matters. As the Chief Executive Officer of the Pennsylvania State Police, do you 18 of where it occurred, what trooper, what bureau, but without 18 19 a name. 19 have ultimate responsibility for producing those 20 Q Without a name? 20 regulations? 21 A Without a name. 21 MR. NEUHAUSER: Tell me what you mean by

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producing them.

BY MR. LAPPAS:

Well, I don't expect that you write them all

yourself, but you institute the regulations -- the

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30 32 regulations of the Department are in place by your STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA: 2 authority; is that accurate? COUNTY OF YORK 3 By virtue of me signing off on the final draft 3 4 of the regulation, yes, sir. I, Lisa A. Hansell, a Reporter Notary-Public, And if you perceive there to be a need for authorized to administer oaths within and for the 6 changes in departmental policy or regulations, do you have Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and take depositions in the 7 the authority to implement such changes? trial of causes, do hereby certify that the foregoing is the 8 Yes, I do. testimony of PAUL J. EVANKO. 9 MR. LAPPAS: Those are the only questions I 9 I further certify that before the taking of 10 10 have. I'm going to request that -- and this is a request said deposition, the witness was duly sworn; that the questions and answers were taken down stenographically by 11 made more to your counsel than to you, Commissioner. If you 12 the said reporter, Lisa A. Hansell, a Reporter could please find out the answers to those questions that 13 Notary-Public, approved and agreed to, and afterwards you said you needed to confer with Lieutenant Colonel Conley 14 reduced to typewriting under the direction of the said about and then make your counsel aware of them, and if you 15 Reporter. could just send me a letter or a memo if you wouldn't mind 15 16 I further certify that the proceedings and 16 doing that. We don't need to reconvene the deposition for 17 evidence contained fully and accurately in the notes by me 17 that. Would you be in agreement with that? 18 on the within deposition, and that this copy is a correct 18 MR. NEUHAUSER: And specifically they were 19 transcript of the same. 20 In testimony whereof, I have hereunto 19 what, or should we rely on the transcript? 21 subscribed my hand this 21st day of November, 2002. 20 MR. LAPPAS: I'm sorry? 22 21 MR. JAKUBIAK: Can we get the transcript 23 22 before? Lisa A. Hansell, Reporter 23 MR. LAPPAS: Absolutely. The one that occurs 24 Notary Public 24 to me deals with reassignment and the type of cases that the 25 My commission expires: Commissioner would be made aware of disciplinary-wise. May 20, 2004 31 MR. NEUHAUSER: Okay. 2 MR. LAPPAS: There may be others, but those are the ones that occur to me right now. 4 (The deposition was concluded at 10:55 a.m.) 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

RANDY YORDY,

Plaintiff

No. 1:01-CV-0206

v. :

: (Judge Kane)

SCOTT BROWN, PAUL EVANKO, :

BERON F. STEAGER, AND BARRY L.

BRINSER, et al.,
Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, GREGORY R. NEUHAUSER, Senior Deputy Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of Attorney General, hereby certify that on November 27, 2002, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document Exhibits in Support of Defendant Evanko's Motion for Summary Judgment by depositing it in the United States mail, first-class postage prepaid to the following:

Spero T. Lappas, Esquire Serratelli, Schiffman, Brown & Calhoon, P.C. 2080 Linglestown Road, Suite 201 Harrisburg, PA 17110

GREGORY R. NEUHAUSER
Senior Deputy Attorney General